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Abstract. Several recent studies in privacy-preserving learning have considered the trade-off be-
tween utility or risk and the level of differential privacy guaranteed by mechanisms for statistical
query processing. In this paper we study this trade-off in private Support Vector Machine (SVM)
learning. We present two efficient mechanisms, one for the case of finite-dimensional feature map-
pings and one for potentially infinite-dimensional feature mappings with translation-invariant ker-
nels. For the case of translation-invariant kernels, the proposed mechanism minimizes regularized
empirical risk in a random Reproducing Kernel Hilbert Space whose kernel uniformly approximates
the desired kernel with high probability. This technique, borrowed from large-scale learning, allows
the mechanism to respond with a finite encoding of the classifier, even when the function class is of
infinite VC dimension. Differential privacy is established using a proof technique from algorithmic
stability. Utilitythe mechanism's response function is pointwise -close to non-private SVM with
probability 1− δis proven by appealing to the smoothness of regularized empirical risk minimiza-
tion with respect to small perturbations to the feature mapping. We conclude with a lower bound on
the optimal differential privacy of the SVM. This negative result states that for any δ, no mechanism
can be simultaneously (, δ)-useful and β-differentially private for small  and small β.
1. Introduction
The goal of a well-designed statistical database is to provide aggregate information about a database's
entries while maintaining individual entries' privacy. These two goals of utility and privacy are inherently
discordant. For a mechanism to be useful, its responses must closely resemble some target statistic of the
database's entries. However to protect privacy, it is often necessary for the mechanism's response distribution
to be `smoothed out', i.e., the mechanism must be randomized to reduce the individual entries' influence on
this distribution. It has been of key interest to the statistical database community to understand when the
goals of utility and privacy can be efficiently achieved simultaneously (Dinur and Nissim, 2003; Barak et al.,
2007; Dwork et al., 2007; Blum et al., 2008; Chaudhuri and Monteleoni, 2009; Kasiviswanathan et al., 2008).
In this paper we consider the practical goal of private regularized empirical risk minimization (ERM) in
Reproducing Kernel Hilbert Spaces for the special case of the Support Vector Machine (SVM). We adopt the
strong notion of differential privacy as formalized by Dwork (2006). Our efficient new mechanisms are shown
to parametrize functions that are close to non-private SVM under the L∞-norm, with high probability. In
our setting this notion of utility is stronger than closeness of risk (cf. Remark 3).
We employ a number of algorithmic and proof techniques new to differential privacy. One of our new
mechanisms borrows a technique from large-scale learning, in which regularized ERM is performed in a
random feature space whose inner-product uniformly approximates the target feature space inner-product.
This random feature space is constructed by viewing the target kernel as a probability measure in the Fourier
domain. This technique enables the finite parametrization of responses from function classes with infinite
VC dimension. To establish utility, we show that regularized ERM is relatively insensitive to perturbations
of the kernel: not only does the technique of learning in a random RKHS enable finitely-encoded privacy-
preserving responses, but these responses well-approximate the responses of non-private SVM. Together
these two techniques may prove useful in extending privacy-preserving mechanisms to learn in large function
spaces. To prove differential privacy, we borrow a proof technique from the area of algorithmic stability. We
believe that stability may become a fruitful avenue for constructing new private mechanisms in the future,
based on learning maps presently known to be stable.
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2 RUBINSTEIN, BARTLETT, HUANG AND TAFT
Of particular interest, is the optimal differential privacy of the SVM, which loosely speaking is the best
level of privacy achievable by any accurate mechanism for SVM learning. Through our privacy-preserving
mechanisms for the SVM, endowed with guarantees of utility, we upper bound optimal differential privacy.
We also provide lower bounds on the SVM's optimal differential privacy, which are impossibility results for
simultaneously achieving high levels of utility and privacy.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. After concluding this section with a summary of
related work, we recall basic concepts of differential privacy and SVM learning in Section 2. Sections 3 and 4
describe the new mechanisms for private SVM learning for finite-dimensional feature maps and (potentially
infinite-dimensional) feature maps with translation-invariant kernels. Each mechanism is accompanied with
proofs of privacy and utility bounds. Section 5 considers the special case of hinge loss and presents an upper
bound on the SVM's optimal differential privacy. A corresponding lower bound is then given in Section 6.
We conclude the paper with several open problems.
1.1. Related Work. There is a rich literature of prior work on differential privacy in the theory community.
The following sections summarize work related to our own, organized to contrast this work with our main
contributions.
1.1.1. Range Spaces Parametrizing Vector-Valued Statistics or Functions with Finite VC-dimension. Early
work on private interactive mechanisms focused on approximating real- and vector-valued statistics (e.g.,
Dinur and Nissim, 2003; Blum et al., 2005; Dwork et al., 2006; Dwork, 2006; Barak et al., 2007). McSherry
and Talwar (2007) first considered private mechanisms with range spaces parametrizing sets more general
than real-valued vectors, and used such differentially private mappings for mechanism design. More related to
our work are the private mechanisms for regularized logistic regression proposed and analyzed by Chaudhuri
and Monteleoni (2009). There the mechanism's range space parametrizes the VC-dimension d + 1 class of
linear hyperplanes in Rd. Kasiviswanathan et al. (2008) showed that discretized concept classes can be PAC
learned or agnostically learned privately, albeit via an inefficient mechanism. Blum et al. (2008) showed
that non-interactive mechanisms can privately release anonymized data such that utility is guaranteed over
classes of predicate queries with polynomial VC dimension, when the domain is discretized. Dwork et al.
(2009) more recently characterized when utility and privacy can be achieved by efficient non-interactive
mechanisms. In this paper we consider efficient mechanisms for private SVM learning, whose range spaces
parametrize real-valued functions (whose sign form trained classifiers). One case covered by our analysis is
learning with a Gaussian kernel, which corresponds to learning over a class of infinite VC dimension.
1.1.2. Practical Privacy-Preserving Learning (Mostly) via Subset-Sums. Most prior work in differential pri-
vacy has focused on the deep analysis of mechanisms for relatively simple statistics (with histograms and
contingency tables as explored by Blum et al. 2005 and Barak et al. 2007 respectively, as examples) and
learning algorithms (e.g., interval queries and half-spaces as explored by Blum et al. 2008), or on construct-
ing learning algorithms that can be decomposed into subset-sum operations (e.g., perceptron, k-NN, ID3 as
described by Blum et al. 2005, and various recommender systems due to the work of McSherry and Mironov
2009). By contrast, we consider the practical goal of SVM learning, which does not decompose into subset-
sums. It is also notable that our mechanisms run in polynomial time. The most related work to our own
in this regard is due to Chaudhuri and Monteleoni (2009), although their results hold only for differentiable
loss, and finite feature mappings.
1.1.3. The Privacy-Utility Trade-Off. Like several prior studies, we consider the trade-off between privacy
and utility. Barak et al. (2007) presented a mechanism for releasing contingency tables that guarantees
differential privacy and also guarantees a notion of accuracy: with high probability all marginals from
the released table are close in L1-norm to the true table's marginals. As mentioned above, Blum et al.
(2008) developed a private non-interactive mechanism that releases anonymized data such that all predicate
queries in a VC-class take on similar values on the anonymized data and original data. In the work of
Kasiviswanathan et al. (2008), utility corresponds to PAC learning: with high probability the response and
target concepts are close, averaged over the underlying measure.
A sequence of prior negative results have shown that any mechanism providing overly accurate responses
cannot be private (Dinur and Nissim, 2003; Dwork et al., 2007; Dwork and Yekhanin, 2008). Dinur and
Nissim (2003) showed that if noise of rate only o(
√
n) is added to subset sum queries on a database of bits
then an adversary can reconstruct a 1− o(1) fraction of the database. This is a threshold phenomenon that
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says if accuracy is too small, privacy cannot be guaranteed at all. This result was more recently extended
to allow for mechanisms that answer a small fraction of queries arbitrarily (Dwork et al., 2007). We show a
similar negative result for the private SVM setting: any mechanism that is too accurate with respect to the
SVM cannot guarantee strong levels of privacy.
1.1.4. Connections between Stability, Robust Statistics, and Global Sensitivity. To prove differential privacy,
we borrow a proof technique from the area of algorithmic stability. In passing Kasiviswanathan et al. (2008)
note the similarity between notions of algorithmic stability and differential privacy, however do not exploit
this. The connection between algorithmic stability and differential privacy is qualitatively similar to the
recent work of Dwork and Lei (2009) who demonstrated that robust estimators can serve as the basis for
private mechanisms, by exploiting the limited influence of outliers on such estimators.
2. Background & Definitions
A database D is a sequence of n > 1 entries or rows (xi, yi) ∈ Rd × {−1, 1}, which are input point-label
pairs or examples. We say that a pair of databases D1, D2 are neighbors if they differ on one entry. A
mechanism M is a service trusted with access to a database D, that releases aggregate information about
D while maintaining privacy of individual entries. By M(D) we mean the response of M on D. We assume
that this is the only information released by the mechanism. Denote the range space ofM by TM . We adopt
the following strong notion of differential privacy due to Dwork (2006).
Definition 1. For any β > 0, a randomized mechanism M provides β-differential privacy, if, for all neigh-
boring databases D1, D2 and all responses t ∈ TM ,
log
(
Pr (M(D1) = t)
Pr (M(D2) = t)
)
≤ β .
The probability in the definition is over the randomization in M . For continuous TM we mean by this
ratio a Radon-Nikodym derivative of the distribution of M(D1) with respect to the distribution of M(D2).
If an adversary knows M and the first n − 1 entries of D, she may simulate the mechanism with different
choices for the missing example. If the mechanism's response distribution varies smoothly with her choice,
the adversary will not be able to infer the true value of entry n by querying M . In the sequel we assume
WLOG that each pair of neighboring databases differ on their last entry.
Intuitively the more an `interesting'1 mechanism M is perturbed to guarantee differential privacy, the less
like M the resulting mechanism Mˆ will become. The next definition formalizes the notion of `likeness'.
Definition 2. Consider two mechanisms Mˆ and M with the same domain and response spaces TMˆ , TM
respectively. Let X be some set and let F be a space of real-valued functions on X that is parametrized
by the response spaces: for every t ∈ TMˆ ∪ TM let ft ∈ F be some function. Finally assume F is endowed
with norm ‖ · ‖F . Then for  > 0 and 0 < δ < 1 we say that2 Mˆ is (, δ)-useful with respect to M if, for all
databases D, Pr
(∥∥∥fMˆ(D) − fM(D)∥∥∥F ≤ ) ≥ δ.
Typically Mˆ will be a privacy-preserving version of M , that has been perturbed somehow. Usefulness
means that not only does Mˆ guarantee privacy of the training database, but that the aggregate information
revealed about the database by Mˆ is `close' to what would be revealed by the desired (but non-private)
mechanism M . In the sequel we will take ‖ · ‖F to be the sup-norm over a subset M ⊆ Rd containing
the data, which we denote by ‖f‖∞;M = supx∈M |f(x)|. It will also be convenient to use the notation
‖k‖∞;M = supx,y∈M |k(x,y)| for bivariate functions k(·, ·).
Remark 3. In the sequel we develop privacy-preserving mechanisms that are useful with respect to the
Support Vector Machine (see the next section for a brief introduction to the SVM). The SVM works to
minimize the expected hinge-loss (i.e., risk in terms of the hinge-loss), which is a convex surrogate for the
expected 0-1 loss. Since the hinge-loss is Lipschitz in the real-valued function output by the SVM, it follows
that a mechanism Mˆ having utility with respect to the SVM also has expected hinge-loss that is within
1Examples of interesting properties include low risk, robustness to a small amount of malicious noise, etc.
2Note that we have chosen to overload the term (, δ)-usefulness introduced by Blum et al. (2008) for non-interactive
mechanisms that release anonymized data. Our definition of usefulness is analogous for the present setting of privacy-preserving
learning, where a single function is released.
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Algorithm 1 SVM
Inputs: database D = {(xi, yi)}ni=1 with xi ∈ Rd, yi ∈ {−1, 1}; kernel k : Rd × Rd → R; convex loss
function `; parameter C > 0.
(1) α? ← Solve the QP dual of Primal (2.1) (see e.g., the derivations by Bishop 2006); and
(2) Return vector α?.
 of the SVM's hinge-loss with high probability. That is, (, δ)-usefulness with respect to the sup-norm is
stronger than guaranteed closeness of risk (absolute bounds on risk for regularized logistic regression are
explored by Chaudhuri and Monteleoni 2009; Kasiviswanathan et al. 2008 consider the task of private PAC
learning, which demands closeness of risk). We consider the hinge-loss further in Sections 5 and 6. Until
then we work with arbitrary convex, Lipschitz losses.
We will see that the presented analysis does not simultaneously guarantee privacy at arbitrary levels and
utility at arbitrary accuracy. The highest level of privacy guaranteed over all (, δ)-useful mechanisms with
respect to a target mechanism M , is quantified by the optimal differential privacy for M . We define this
notion for the SVM here, but the concept extends to any target mechanism of interest. We present upper
and lower bounds on β(, δ, C, n, `, k) for the SVM in Sections 5 and 6 respectively.
Definition 4. For , C > 0, δ ∈ (0, 1), n > 1, loss function `(y, yˆ) convex in yˆ, and kernel k, the optimal
differential privacy for the SVM is the function
β(, δ, C, n, `, k) = inf
Mˆ∈I
sup
(D1,D2)∈D
sup
t∈TMˆ
log
Pr
(
Mˆ(D1) = t
)
Pr
(
Mˆ(D2) = t
)
 ,
where I is the set of all (, δ)-useful mechanisms with respect to the SVM with parameter C, loss `, and
kernel k; and D is the set of all pairs of neighboring databases with n entries.
2.1. Background on Support Vector Machines. Soft-margin SVM learning corresponds to the convex
Primal program
min
w∈RF
1
2
‖w‖22 +
C
n
n∑
i=1
` (yi, fw(xi)) ,(2.1)
where the xi ∈ Rd are training input points and the yi ∈ {−1, 1} are their training labels, n is the size of the
training set, φ : Rd → RF is a feature mapping taking points in input space Rd to some (possibly infinite)
F -dimensional feature space, `(y, yˆ) is a loss function convex in yˆ, and w is a hyperplane normal vector in
feature space.
When F is finite, predictions are made by taking the sign of f?(x) = fw?(x) = 〈φ(x),w?〉. We will refer
to both fw(·) and sgn (fw(·)) as classifiers, with the exact meaning apparent from the context. When F is
large and when inner-products in feature space may be computed quickly via an explicit representation of the
kernel function k(x,y) = 〈φ(x), φ(y)〉, the solution may be more easily obtained via the dual. For example,
see Program (5.1) in Section 5 for the dual formulation of the hinge-loss `(y, yˆ) = (1 − yyˆ)+, which is the
loss most commonly associated with soft-margin SVM. Other examples include the square loss (1 − yyˆ)2
and logistic loss log (1 + exp (−yyˆ)). The vector of maximizing dual variables α? returned by dualized SVM
parametrizes the function f? = fα? as fα(·) =
∑m
i=1 αiyik(·,xi).
More generally, the Support Vector Machine can be seen as performing regularized ERM in a Reproducing
Kernel Hilbert Space (RKHS) H. The Representer Theorem (Kimeldorf and Wahba, 1971) states that the
minimizing f? = arg minf∈H 12‖f‖2H + Cn
∑n
i=1 `(yi, f(xi)) lies in the span of the functions k(·,xi) ∈ H.
Indeed the above dual expansion shows that the coordinates in this subspace are given by the α?i yi.
We define the mechanism SVM to be the dual optimization that responds with the vector α?, as described
by Algorithm 1. For general information about SVMs see e.g., (Burges, 1998; Cristianini and Shawe-Taylor,
2000; Schölkopf and Smola, 2001; Bishop, 2006). We end this section with the definition of an important
class of kernels (see Table 1 for examples).
Definition 5. A kernel function of the form k(x,y) = g(x − y), for some function g, is called translation-
invariant.
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Kernel g(∆) p(ω)
RBF exp
(
−‖∆‖222σ2
)
(2pi)−d/2 exp
(
−‖ω‖222
)
Laplacian exp (−‖∆‖1)
∏d
i=1
1
pi(1+ω2i )
Cauchy
∏d
i=1
2
1+∆2i
exp (−‖∆‖1)
Table 1. Example translation-invariant kernels, their g functions and the corresponding
Fourier transforms.
3. Mechanism for Finite Feature Maps
As a first step towards private SVM learning we begin by considering the simple case of finite F -
dimensional feature maps. Algorithm 2 describes the PrivateSVM-Finite mechanism, which follows
the usual pattern of preserving differential privacy: after forming the primal solution to the SVMan
F -dimensional vectorthe mechanism adds Laplace-distributed noise to the weight vector. Guaranteeing
differential privacy proceeds via the usual two-step process of calculating the L1-sensitivity of the SVM's
weight vector, then showing that β-differential privacy follows from sensitivity together with the choice of
Laplace noise with scale equal to sensitivity divided by β.
To calculate sensitivity, we exploit the algorithmic stability of regularized ERM. Intuitively, stability cor-
responds to continuity of a learning map. Several notions of stability are known to lead to good generalization
error bounds (Devroye and Wagner, 1979; Kearns and Ron, 1999; Bousquet and Elisseeff, 2002; Kutin and
Niyogi, 2002), sometimes in cases where class capacity-based approaches such as VC theory do not apply. A
learning map A is a function that maps a database D to a classifier fD; it is precisely the composition of a
mechanism followed by the classifier parametrization mapping.3 A learning map A is said to have γ-uniform
stability with respect to loss `(·, ·) if for all neighboring databases D,D′, the losses of the classifiers trained
on D and D′ are close on all test examples ‖`(·,A(D))− `(·,A(D′))‖∞ ≤ γ (Bousquet and Elisseeff, 2002).
Our first lemma computes sensitivity by following the proof of (Schölkopf and Smola, 2001, Theorem 12.4)
which establishes that SVM learning has uniform stability (a result due to Bousquet and Elisseeff 2002). For
simplicity we restrict the proof of sensitivity to differentiable loss functions in Lemma 6; the result remains
the same for general convex loss functions. See Lemma 21 for an almost identical proof for subdifferentiable
losses.
Lemma 6. Consider loss function `(y, yˆ) that is differentiable, convex and L-Lipschitz in yˆ, and an RKHS H
induced by finite F -dimensional feature mapping φ with bounded norm k(x,x) ≤ κ2 for all x ∈ Rd. Let wS ∈
RF be the minimizer of the following regularized empirical risk function for each database S = {(xi, yi)}ni=1
Rreg(w, S) =
C
n
n∑
i=1
` (yi, fw(xi)) +
1
2
‖w‖22 .
Then for every pair of neighboring databases D,D′ of n entries, ‖wD −wD′‖1 ≤ 4LCκ
√
F/n.
Proof. For convenience we define Remp(w, S) = n−1
∑n
i=1 ` (yi, fw(xi)) for any database S, then the first-
order necessary KKT conditions imply
∂wRreg(wD, D) = C∂wRemp(wD, D) +wD = 0(3.1)
∂wRreg(wD′ , D′) = C∂wRemp(wD′ , D′) +wD′ = 0 ,(3.2)
where ∂w is the partial derivative operator with respect to w. Define the auxiliary risk function
R˜(w) = C〈∂wRemp(wD, D)− ∂wRemp(wD′ , D′), w −wD′〉+ 12‖w −wD′‖
2
2 .
It is easy to see that R˜(w) is strictly convex in w and that R˜(wD′) = 0. And since by Equation (3.2)
∂wR˜(w) = C∂wRemp(wD, D)− C∂wRemp(wD′ , D′) +w −wD′
= C∂wRemp(wD, D) +w ,
3For example an SVM mechanism may return a weight vector w? or dual coefficients α? which in turn parametrizes the
classifier f?. The SVM learning map takes the training database directly to the classifier.
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Algorithm 2 PrivateSVM-Finite
Inputs: database D = {(xi, yi)}ni=1 with xi ∈ Rd, yi ∈ {−1, 1}; finite feature map φ : Rd → RF and
induced kernel k; convex loss function `; and parameters λ,C > 0.
(1) α? ← Run Algorithm 1 on D with parameter C, kernel k, and loss `;
(2) w˜←∑ni=1 α?i yiφ (xi);
(3) µ← Draw i.i.d. sample of F scalars from Laplace (0, λ); and
(4) Return wˆ = w˜ + µ
it follows that R˜(w) is minimized at wD by Equation (3.1). Thus R˜(wD) ≤ 0. Next simplify the first term
of R˜(wD), scaled by n/C for simplicity:
n〈∂wRemp(wD, D)− ∂wRemp(wD′ , D′), wD −wD′〉
=
n∑
i=1
〈∂w` (yi, fwD (xi))− ∂w`
(
y′i, fwD′ (x
′
i)
)
, wD −wD′〉
=
n−1∑
i=1
(
`′ (yi, fwD (xi))− `′
(
yi, fwD′ (xi)
)) (
fwD (xi)− fwD′ (xi)
)
+`′ (yn, fwD (xn))
(
fwD (xn)− fwD′ (xn)
)− `′ (y′n, fwD′ (x′n)) (fwD (x′n)− fwD′ (x′n))
≥ `′ (yn, fwD (xn))
(
fwD (xn)− fwD′ (xn)
)− `′ (y′n, fwD′ (x′n)) (fwD (x′n)− fwD′ (x′n)) ,
where `′(y, yˆ) = ∂yˆ`(y, yˆ). The second equality follows from ∂w`(y, fw(x)) = `′(y, fw(x))φ(x) and x′i = xi
and y′i = yi for each i ∈ [n− 1], and the inequality follows from the differentiability and convexity4 of ` in yˆ.
Combined with R˜(wD) ≤ 0 this yields
n
2C
‖wD −wD′‖22
≤ `′ (y′n, fwD′ (x′n)) (fwD (x′n)− fwD′ (x′n))− `′ (yn, fwD (xn)) (fwD (xn)− fwD′ (xn))
≤ 2L∥∥fwD − fwD′∥∥∞ ,(3.3)
by the Lipschitz continuity of `. Now by the reproducing property and Cauchy-Schwartz inequality we can
upper bound the classifier difference's infinity norm by the Euclidean norm on the weight vectors: for each
x ∣∣fwD (x)− fwD′ (x)∣∣ = |〈φ(x),wD −wD′〉|
≤ ‖φ(x)‖2 ‖wD −wD′‖2
=
√
k(x,x) ‖wD −wD′‖2
≤ κ ‖wD −wD′‖2 .
Combining this with Inequality (3.3) yields ‖wD−wD′‖2 ≤ 4LCκ/n. L1-based sensitivity then follows from
the inequality ‖w‖1 ≤
√
F‖w‖2 for all w ∈ RF . 
With the weight vector's sensitivity in hand, differential privacy follows immediately from the proof
technique established by Dwork et al. (2006).
Theorem 7 (Privacy of PrivateSVM-Finite). For any β > 0, database D of size n, C > 0, loss function
`(y, yˆ) that is convex and L-Lipschitz in yˆ, and finite F -dimensional feature map with kernel k(x,x) ≤ κ2
for all x ∈ Rd, PrivateSVM-Finite run on D with loss `, kernel k, noise parameter λ ≥ 4LCκ√F/(βn)
and regularization parameter C guarantees β-differential privacy.
This first main result establishes the usual kind of differential privacy guarantee for the new PrivateSVM-
Finite algorithm. The more private the data, the more noise must be added. The more entries in the
database, the less noise is needed to achieve the same level of privacy. Since the noise vector µ has exponential
tails, standard tail bound inequalities quickly lead to (, δ)-usefulness for PrivateSVM-Finite.
4Namely for differentiable convex f and any a, b ∈ R, (f ′(a)− f ′(b)) (a− b) ≥ 0.
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Theorem 8 (Utility of PrivateSVM-Finite). Consider any C > 0, n > 1, database D of n entries,
arbitrary convex loss `, and finite F -dimensional feature mapping φ with kernel k and |φ(x)i| ≤ Φ for all
x ∈ M and i ∈ [F ] for some Φ > 0 and M ⊆ Rd. For any  > 0 and δ ∈ (0, 1), PrivateSVM-Finite run
on D with loss `, kernel k, noise parameter 0 < λ ≤ 
2Φ(F loge 2+loge 1δ )
, and regularization parameter C, is
(, δ)-useful with respect to the SVM under the ‖ · ‖∞;M-norm.
Proof. Our goal is to compare the SVM and PrivateSVM-Finite classifications of any point x ∈M:∣∣∣fMˆ(D)(x)− fM(D)(x)∣∣∣ = |〈wˆ, φ(x)〉 − 〈w˜, φ(x)〉|
= |〈µ, φ(x)〉|
≤ ‖µ‖1 ‖φ(x)‖∞
≤ Φ ‖µ‖1 .
The absolute value of a zero mean Laplace random variable with scale parameter λ is exponentially dis-
tributed with scale λ−1. Moreover the sum of q i.i.d. exponential random variables has Erlang q-distribution
with the same scale parameter.5 Thus we have, for Erlang F -distributed random variable X and any t > 0,
∀x ∈M,
∣∣∣fMˆ(D)(x)− fM(D)(x)∣∣∣ ≤ ΦX
⇒ ∀ > 0, Pr
(∥∥∥fMˆ(D) − fM(D)∥∥∥∞;M > 
)
≤ Pr (X > /Φ)
= Pr
(
etX > et/Φ
)
≤ E
[
etX
]
et/Φ
.(3.4)
Here we have employed the standard Chernoff tail bound technique using Markov's inequality. The numerator
of (3.4), the moment generating function of the Erlang F -distribution with parameter λ, is (1 − λt)−F for
all t < λ−1. Together with the choice of t = (2λ)−1, this gives
Pr
(∥∥∥fMˆ(D) − fM(D)∥∥∥∞;M > 
)
≤ (1− λt)−F e−t/Φ
= 2F e−/(2λΦ)
= exp (F loge 2− /(2λΦ)) .
And provided that λ ≤ / (2Φ (F loge 2 + loge 1δ )) this probability is bounded by δ. 
Our second main result establishes that PrivateSVM-Finite is not only differentially private, but that
it releases a classifier that is similar to the SVM. Utility and privacy are competing properties, however,
since utility demands that the noise not be too large.
4. Mechanism for Translation-Invariant Kernels
Consider now the problem of privately learning in an RKHS H induced by an infinite dimensional feature
mapping φ. As a mechanism's response must be finitely encodable, the primal parametrization seems less
appealing as it did in PrivateSVM-Finite. It is natural to look to the SVM's dual solution as a starting
point: the Representer Theorem (Kimeldorf and Wahba, 1971) states that the optimizing f? ∈ H must
be in the span of the dataa finite-dimensional subspace. While the coordinates in this subspacethe α?i
dual variablescould be perturbed in the usual way to guarantee differential privacy, the subspace's basis
the dataare also needed to parametrize f?. To side-step this apparent stumbling block, we take another
approach by approximating H with a random RKHS Hˆ induced by a random finite-dimensional map φˆ. This
then allows us to respond with a finite primal parametrization. Algorithm 3 summarizes the PrivateSVM
mechanism.
As noted recently by Rahimi and Recht (2008), the Fourier transform p of the g function of a continuous
positive-definite translation-invariant kernel is a non-negative measure (Rudin, 1994). Rahimi and Recht
5The Erlang q-distribution has density
xq−1 exp(−x/λ)
λq(q−1)! , CDF 1− e−x/λ
Pq−1
j=0
(x/λ)j
j!
, expectation qλ and variance qλ2.
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Algorithm 3 PrivateSVM
Inputs: database D = {(xi, yi)}ni=1 with xi ∈ Rd, yi ∈ {−1, 1}; translation-invariant kernel
k(x,y) = g(x− y) with Fourier transform p(ω) = 2−1  e−j〈ω,x〉g(x) dx; convex loss function `; parameters
λ,C > 0 and dˆ ∈ N.
(1) ρ1, . . . ,ρdˆ ←Draw i.i.d. sample of dˆ vectors in Rd from p;
(2) αˆ← Run Algorithm 1 on D with parameter C, kernel kˆ induced by map (4.1), and loss `;
(3) w˜←∑ni=1 yiαˆiφˆ (xi) where φˆ is defined in Equation (4.1);
(4) µ← Draw i.i.d. sample of 2dˆ scalars from Laplace (0, λ); and
(5) Return wˆ = w˜ + µ and ρ1, . . . ,ρdˆ
(2008) exploit this fact to construct a random finite-dimensional RKHS Hˆ by drawing dˆ vectors from p.
These vectors ρ1, . . . ,ρdˆ define the following random 2dˆ-dimensional feature map
φˆ(·) = dˆ−1/2 [cos (〈ρ1, ·〉) , sin (〈ρ1, ·〉) , . . . , cos (〈ρdˆ, ·〉) , sin (〈ρdˆ, ·〉)]T .(4.1)
Inner-products in the random feature space approximate k(·, ·) uniformly, and to arbitrary precision depend-
ing on parameter dˆ, as restated in Lemma 13. We denote the inner-product in the random feature space
by kˆ. Rahimi and Recht (2008) applied this approximation to large-scale learning (situations where n is
large). Instead of employing non-linear SVM's dual solution which takes O(n2) time, the primal solution to
linear SVM on φˆ is used, as it takes time quadratic in dˆ to compute. For large-scale learning, good approx-
imations can be found for dˆ  n. Table 1 presents three important translation-invariant kernels and their
transformations. PrivateSVM employs the same trick for translation-invariant kernels, but in a different
setting. Here regularized ERM is performed in Hˆ, not to avoid complexity in n, but to provide a direct finite
representation w˜ of the primal solution in the case of infinite dimensional feature spaces. After performing
regularized ERM in Hˆ, appropriate Laplace noise is added to the primal solution w˜ to guarantee differential
privacy as before.
PrivateSVM is computationally efficient. Algorithm 3 takes O(dˆ) time to compute each entry of the
kernel matrix, or a total time of O(dˆn2) on top of running dual SVM in the random feature space which is
worst-case O(n3s) for the analytic solution (where ns ≤ n is the number of support vectors), and faster using
numerical methods such as chunking (Burges, 1998). To achieve (, δ)-usefulness wrt the hinge-loss SVM dˆ
must be taken to be O
(
d
4
(
log 1δ + log
1

))
(cf. Corollary 15). By comparison it takes O(dn2) to construct
the kernel matrix for any translation-invariant kernel.
As with the SVM and PrivateSVM-Finite, the response of Algorithm 3 can be used to make clas-
sifications on future test points by constructing the classifier fˆ?(·) = fwˆ(·) = 〈wˆ, φˆ(·)〉. Unlike the pre-
vious mechanisms, however, PrivateSVM must include a parametrization of feature map φˆthe sample
{ρi}dˆi=1in its response. Of PrivateSVM's total response, only wˆ depends on database D. The ρi are
data-independent vectors drawn from the transform p of the kernel, which we assume to be known by the
adversary (to wit the adversary knows the mechanism itself, including k). Thus to establish differential
privacy we need only consider the data-dependent weight vector, fortunately we have already considered the
similar case of PrivateSVM-Finite.
Corollary 9 (Privacy of PrivateSVM). For any β > 0, database D of size n, C > 0, dˆ ∈ N, loss function
`(y, yˆ) that is convex and L-Lipschitz in yˆ, and translation-invariant kernel k, PrivateSVM run on D
with loss `, kernel k, noise parameter λ ≥ 22.5LC
√
dˆ/(βn), approximation parameter dˆ, and regularization
parameter C guarantees β-differential privacy.
Proof. The result follows immediately from Theorem 7 since w˜ is the primal solution of SVM with kernel kˆ,
the response vector wˆ = w˜ + µ for i.i.d. Laplace µ, and kˆ(x,x) = 1 for all x ∈ RD. 
This result is surprising, in that PrivateSVM is able to guarantee privacy for regularized ERM over a
function class of infinite VC-dimension, where the obvious way to return the learned classifier (responding
with the dual variables and feature mapping) reveals all the entries corresponding to the support vectors,
completely.
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Like PrivateSVM-Finite, PrivateSVM is useful with respect to the SVM. If we denote the function
parametrized by intermediate weight vector w˜ by f˜ , then the same argument for the utility of PrivateSVM-
Finite establishes the high-probability proximity of f˜ and f?.
Lemma 10. Consider a run of Algorithms 1 and 3 with dˆ ∈ N, C > 0, convex loss and translation-invariant
kernel. Denote by fˆ? and f˜ the classifiers parametrized by weight vectors wˆ and w˜ respectively, where these
vectors are related by wˆ = w˜ + µ with µ iid∼ Laplace(0, λ) in Algorithm 3. For any  > 0 and δ ∈ (0, 1), if
0 < λ ≤ min
{

24 loge 2
√
dˆ
, 
√
dˆ
8 loge
2
δ
}
then
Pr
(∥∥∥fˆ? − f˜∥∥∥
∞
≤ 
2
)
≥ 1− δ
2
.
Proof. As in the proof of Theorem 8 we can use the Chernoff trick to show that, for Erlang 2dˆ-distributed
random variable X, the choice of t = (2λ)−1,and for any  > 0
Pr
(∥∥∥fˆ? − f˜∥∥∥
∞
> /2
)
≤ E
[
etX
]
et
√
dˆ/2
≤ (1− λt)−2dˆ e−t
√
dˆ/2
= 22dˆe−
√
dˆ/(4λ)
= exp
(
dˆ loge 4− 
√
dˆ/(4λ)
)
.
Provided that λ ≤ /
(
24 loge 2
√
dˆ
)
this is bounded by exp
(
−
√
dˆ/(8λ)
)
. Moreover if λ ≤ 
√
dˆ/
(
8 loge
2
δ
)
,
then the claim follows. 
To show a similar result for f? and f˜ , we exploit smoothness of the regularized ERM with respect to
small changes in the RKHS itself. To the best of our knowledge, this kind of stability to the feature mapping
has not been used before. We begin with a technical lemma that we will use to exploit the convexity of the
regularized empirical risk functional.
Lemma 11. Let R be a functional on Hilbert space H satisfying R[f ] ≥ R[f?]+ a2‖f −f?‖2H for some a > 0,
f? ∈ H and all f ∈ H. Then R[f ] ≤ R[f?] +  implies ‖f − f?‖Hˆ ≤
√
2
a , for all  > 0, f ∈ H.
Proof. By assumption and the antecedent
‖f − f?‖2Hˆ ≤
2
a
(R[f ]−R[f?])
≤ 2
a
(R[f?] + −R[f?])
= 2/a .
Taking square roots of both sides yields the consequent. 
Provided that the kernel functions k and kˆ are uniformly close, the next lemma exploits insensitivity
of regularized ERM to perturbations of the feature mapping to show that f? and f˜ are pointwise close.
Lemma 22 re-proves this result for non-differentiable loss functions.
Lemma 12. Let H be an RKHS with translation-invariant kernel k, and let Hˆ be the random RKHS
corresponding to feature map (4.1) induced by k. Let C be a positive scalar and loss `(y, yˆ) be differentiable,
convex, and L-Lipschitz in yˆ. Consider the regularized empirical risk minimizers in each RKHS
f? ∈ arg min
f∈H
C
n
n∑
i=1
`(yi, f(xi)) +
1
2
‖f‖2H ,
g? ∈ arg min
g∈Hˆ
C
n
n∑
i=1
`(yi, g(xi)) +
1
2
‖g‖2Hˆ .
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Let M ⊆ Rd be any set containing x1, . . . ,xn. For any  > 0, if the dual variables from both optimiza-
tions have L1-norms bounded by some Λ > 0 and
∥∥∥k − kˆ∥∥∥
∞;M
≤ min
{
1, 
2
22
“
Λ+2
√
(CL+Λ/2)Λ
”2
}
then
‖f? − g?‖∞;M ≤ /2.
Proof. Denote the empirical risk functional by Remp[f ] = n−1
∑n
i=1 ` (yi, f(xi)) and the regularized empirical
risk functional Rreg[f ] = C Remp[f ] + ‖f‖2/2, for the appropriate RKHS norm (either H or Hˆ). Let f?
denote the regularized empirical risk minimizer in H, given by parameter vector α?, and let g? denote the
regularized empirical risk minimizer in Hˆ given by parameter vector β?. Let gα? =
∑n
i=1 α
?
i yiφˆ(xi) and
fβ? =
∑n
i=1 β
?
i yiφ(xi) denote the images of f
? and g? under the natural mapping between the spans of the
data in RKHS's Hˆ and H respectively. We will first show that these four functions have arbitrarily close
regularized empirical risk in their respective RKHS, and then that this implies uniform proximity of the
functions themselves. First observe that for any g ∈ Hˆ
RHˆreg[g] = C Remp[g] +
1
2
‖g‖2Hˆ
≥ C〈∂gRemp[g?], g − g?〉Hˆ + C Remp[g?] +
1
2
‖g‖2Hˆ
= 〈∂gRHˆreg[g?], g − g?〉Hˆ − 〈g?, g − g?〉Hˆ + C Remp[g?] +
1
2
‖g‖2Hˆ
= C Remp[g?] +
1
2
‖g‖2Hˆ − 〈g?, g − g?〉Hˆ
= C Remp[g?] +
1
2
‖g?‖2Hˆ +
1
2
‖g‖2Hˆ −
1
2
‖g?‖2Hˆ − 〈g?, g − g?〉Hˆ
= RHˆreg[g
?] +
1
2
‖g‖2Hˆ − 〈g?, g〉Hˆ +
1
2
‖g?‖2Hˆ
= RHˆreg[g
?] +
1
2
‖g − g?‖2Hˆ ,
The inequality follows from the convexity of Remp[·]; the subsequent equality by ∂gRHˆreg[g] = C ∂gRemp[g]+g;
the third equality by ∂gR
Hˆ
reg[g
?] = 0; and the remainder by gathering terms. With this, Lemma 11 states
that for any g ∈ Hˆ and ′ > 0,
RHˆreg[g] ≤ RHˆreg[g?] + ′ ⇒ ‖g − g?‖Hˆ ≤
√
2′ .(4.2)
Next we will show that the antecedent is true for g = gα? . Conditioned on
{∥∥∥k − kˆ∥∥∥
∞;M
≤ ′
}
, for all
x ∈M
|f?(x)− gα?(x)| =
∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
i=1
α?i yi
(
k(xi,x)− kˆ(xi,x)
)∣∣∣∣∣
≤
n∑
i=1
|α?i |
∣∣∣k(xi,x)− kˆ(xi,x)∣∣∣
≤ ′ ‖α?‖1
≤ ′Λ ,(4.3)
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by the bound on ‖α?‖1. This and the Lipschitz continuity of the loss leads to∣∣∣RHreg[f?]−RHˆreg[gα? ]∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣C Remp[f?]− C Remp[gα? ] + 12‖f?‖2H − 12‖gα?‖2Hˆ
∣∣∣∣
≤ C
n
n∑
i=1
|` (yi, f?(xi))− ` (yi, gα?(xi))|+ 12
∣∣∣α?′ (K− Kˆ)α?∣∣∣
≤ C
n
n∑
i=1
L ‖f? − gα?‖∞;M +
1
2
∣∣∣α?′ (K− Kˆ)α?∣∣∣
≤ CL ‖f? − gα?‖∞;M +
1
2
‖α?‖1
∥∥∥(K− Kˆ)α?∥∥∥
∞
≤ CL ‖f? − gα?‖∞;M +
1
2
‖α?‖21 ′
≤ CL′Λ + Λ2′/2
=
(
CL+
Λ
2
)
Λ′ .
Similarly,
∣∣∣RHˆreg[g?]−RHreg[fβ? ]∣∣∣ ≤ (CL+Λ/2)Λ′ by the same argument. And since RHreg[fβ? ] ≥ RHreg[f?] and
RHˆreg[gα? ] ≥ RHˆreg[g?] we have proved that RHˆreg[gα? ] ≤ RHreg[f?]+(CL+Λ/2)Λ′ ≤ RHreg[fβ? ]+(CL+Λ/2)Λ′ ≤
RHˆreg[g
?] + 2(CL+ Λ/2)Λ′. And by implication (4.2),
‖gα? − g?‖Hˆ ≤ 2
√(
CL+
Λ
2
)
Λ′ .(4.4)
Now kˆ(x,x) = 1 for each x ∈ Rd implies
|gα?(x)− g?(x)| =
〈
gα? − g?, kˆ(x, ·)
〉
Hˆ
≤ ‖gα? − g?‖Hˆ
√
kˆ(x,x)
= ‖gα? − g?‖Hˆ ,
This combines with Inequality (4.4) to yield
‖gα? − g?‖∞;M ≤ 2
√(
CL+
Λ
2
)
Λ′ .
Together with Inequality (4.3) this finally implies that ‖f? − g?‖∞;M ≤ ′Λ + 2
√
(CL+ Λ/2) Λ′, con-
ditioned on event A′ =
{∥∥∥k − kˆ∥∥∥
∞
≤ ′
}
. For desired accuracy  > 0, conditioning on event A′ with
′ = min
{
/
[
2
(
Λ + 2
√
(CL+ Λ/2) Λ
)]
, 2/
[
2
(
Λ + 2
√
(CL+ Λ/2) Λ
)]2}
yields bound ‖f? − g?‖∞;M ≤
/2: if ′ ≤ 1 then /2 ≥ √′
(
Λ + 2
√
(CL+ Λ/2) Λ
)
≥ ′Λ + 2√(CL+ Λ/2) Λ′ provided that ′ ≤
2/
[
2
(
Λ + 2
√
(CL+ Λ/2) Λ
)]2
. Otherwise if ′ > 1 then we have /2 ≥ ′
(
Λ + 2
√
(CL+ Λ/2) Λ
)
≥
′Λ+2
√
(CL+ Λ/2) Λ′ provided ′ ≤ /
[
2
(
Λ + 2
√
(CL+ Λ/2) Λ
)]
. Since for any H > 0, min
{
H,H2
} ≥
min
{
1, H2
}
, the result follows. 
We now recall the result due to Rahimi and Recht (2008) that establishes the non-asymptotic uniform
convergence of the kernel functions required by the previous Lemma (i.e., an upper bound on the probability
of event A′).
Lemma 13 (Rahimi and Recht 2008, Claim 1). For any  > 0, δ ∈ (0, 1), translation-invariant kernel k
and compact setM⊂ Rd, if dˆ ≥ 4(d+2)2 loge
(
28(σpdiam(M))2
δ2
)
, then Algorithm 3's random feature mapping φˆ
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defined in Equation (4.1) satisfies Pr
(∥∥∥kˆ − k∥∥∥
∞
< 
)
≥ 1− δ, where σ2p = E [〈ω,ω〉] is the second moment
of the Fourier transform p of k's g function.
Combining these ingredients establishes utility for PrivateSVM.
Theorem 14 (Utility of PrivateSVM). Consider any database D, compact set M ⊂ Rd containing D,
convex loss `, translation-invariant kernel k, and scalars C,  > 0 and δ ∈ (0, 1). Suppose the SVM with loss
`, kernel k and parameter C has dual variables with L1-norm bounded by Λ. Then Algorithm 3 run on D with
loss `, kernel k, parameters dˆ ≥ 4(d+2)θ() loge
(
29(σpdiam(M))2
δθ()
)
where θ() = min
{
1, 
4
24
“
Λ+2
√
(CL+Λ/2)Λ
”4
}
,
λ ≤ min
{

24 loge 2
√
dˆ
, 
√
dˆ
8 loge
2
δ
}
and C is (, δ)-useful with respect to Algorithm 1 run on D with loss `, kernel
k and parameter C, wrt the ‖ · ‖∞;M-norm.
Proof. Lemma's 12 and 10 combined via the triangle inequality, with Lemma 13, together establish the result
as follows. Define A to be the conditioning event regarding the approximation of k by kˆ, denote the events in
Lemma's 12 and 8 by B and C (beware we are overloading C with the regularization parameter; its meaning
will be apparent from the context), and the target event in the theorem by D.
A =
∥∥∥kˆ − k∥∥∥∞;M < min
1, 222„Λ+2q(CL+ Λ2 )Λ«2


B =
{∥∥∥f? − f˜∥∥∥
∞;M
≤ /2
}
C =
{∥∥∥fˆ? − f˜∥∥∥
∞
≤ /2
}
D =
{∥∥∥f? − fˆ?∥∥∥
∞;M
≤ 
}
The claim is a bound on Pr(D). By the triangle inequality events B and C together imply D. Second
note that event C is independent of A and B. Thus Pr(D | A) ≥ Pr(B ∩ C | A) = Pr(B | A) Pr(C) ≥
1 · (1 − δ/2), for sufficiently small λ. Finally Lemma 13 bounds Pr(A) as follows: provided that dˆ ≥
4(d + 2) loge
(
29 (σpdiam(M))2 / (δθ())
)
/θ() where θ() = min
{
1, 4/
[
2
(
Λ + 2
√
(CL+ Λ/2) Λ
)]4}
we
have Pr(A) ≥ 1− δ/2. Together this yields Pr(D) = Pr(D | A) Pr(A) ≥ (1− δ/2)2 ≥ 1− δ. 
Again we see that utility and privacy place competing constraints on the level of noise λ. Next we will
use these interactions to upper-bound the optimal differential privacy of the SVM.
5. Hinge-Loss and an Upper Bound on Optimal Differential Privacy
We begin by `plugging' hinge loss `(y, yˆ) = (1 − yyˆ)+ into the main results on privacy and utility of
the previous section (similar computations can be done for PrivateSVM-Finite and other convex loss
functions). The following is the dual formulation of hinge-loss SVM learning:
max
α∈Rn
n∑
i=1
αi − 12
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
αiαjyiyjk(xi,xj)(5.1)
s.t. 0 ≤ αi ≤ C
n
∀i ∈ [n] .
Corollary 15. Consider any database D of size n, scalar C > 0, and translation-invariant kernel k. For
any β > 0 and dˆ ∈ N, PrivateSVM run on D with hinge loss, noise parameter λ ≥ 22.5C
√
dˆ
βn , approximation
parameter dˆ, and regularization parameter C, guarantees β-differential privacy. Moreover for any compact
setM⊂ Rd containing D, and scalars  > 0 and δ ∈ (0, 1), PrivateSVM run on D with hinge loss, kernel
k, noise parameter λ ≤ min
{

24 loge 2
√
dˆ
, 
√
dˆ
8 loge
2
δ
}
, approximation parameter dˆ ≥ 4(d+2)θ() loge
(
29(σpdiam(M))2
δθ()
)
with θ() = min
{
1, 
4
212C4
}
, and regularization parameter C, is (, δ)-useful wrt hinge-loss SVM run on D
with kernel k, and parameter C.
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Proof. The first result follows from Theorem 7 and the fact that hinge-loss is convex and 1-Lipschitz on R:
i.e., ∂yˆ` = 1[1 ≥ yyˆ] ≤ 1. The second result follows almost immediately from Theorem 14. For hinge-loss
we have that feasible αi's are bounded by C/n (and so Λ = C) by the dual's box constraints and that L = 1,
implying we take θ() = min
{
1, 
4
24C4(1+
√
6)4
}
. This is bounded by the stated θ(). 
Combining the competing requirements on noise level λ upper-bounds optimal differential privacy of
hinge-loss SVM.
Theorem 16. The optimal differential privacy for hinge-loss SVM learning on translation-invariant kernel
k is bounded by β(, δ, C, n, `, k) = O
(
1
3n
√
log 1δ
(
log 1 + log
2 1
δ
))
.
Proof. Consider hinge loss in Corollary 15. Privacy places a lower bound of β ≥ 22.5C
√
dˆ/(λn) for any
chosen λ, which we can convert to a lower bound on β in terms of  and δ as follows. For small , we have
θ() = 42−12C−4 and so to achieve (, δ)-usefulness we must take dˆ = O
(
1
4 loge
(
1
δ4
))
. There are two
cases for utility, if λ = /
(
24 loge
(
2
√
dˆ
))
then β = O
(√
dˆ loge
√
dˆ
n
)
= O
(
1
3n
√
log 1δ
(
log 1 + log
2 1
δ
))
.
Otherwise we are in the second case, with λ = 
√
dˆ
8 loge
2
δ
yielding β = O
(
1
n log
1
δ
)
which is dominated by the
first case as  ↓ 0. 
A natural question arises from this discussion: given any mechanism that is (, δ)-useful with respect to
hinge SVM, for how small a β can we possibly hope to guarantee β-differential privacy? In other words,
what lower bounds exist for the optimal differential privacy for the SVM?
6. Lower Bounding Optimal Differential Privacy
To lower bound β for any (, δ)-useful mechanism, we first establish a negative sensitivity result for the
SVM, by constructing two neighboring databases on which SVM classifiers differ.
Lemma 17. For any C > 0, n > 1 and 0 <  <
√
C
2n , there exists a pair of neighboring databases D1, D2
on n entries, such that the functions f?1 , f
?
2 parametrized by SVM run with parameter C, linear kernel, and
hinge loss on D1, D2 respectively, satisfy ‖f?1 − f?2 ‖∞ > 2.
Proof. We construct the two databases on the line as follows. Let 0 < m < M be scalars to be chosen later.
Both databases share negative examples x1 = . . . = xbn/2c = −M and positive examples xbn/2c+1 = . . . =
xn−1 = M . Each database has xn = M −m, with yn = −1 for D1 and yn = 1 for D2. In what follows we
use subscripts to denote an example's parent database, so (xi,j , yi,j) is the jth example from Di. Consider
the result of running primal SVM on each database
w?1 = arg min
w∈R
1
2
w2 +
C
n
n∑
i=1
(1− y1,iwx1,i)+
w?2 = arg min
w∈R
1
2
w2 +
C
n
n∑
i=1
(1− y2,iwx2,i)+ .
Each optimization is strictly convex and unconstrained, so the optimizing w?1 , w
?
2 are characterized by the
first-order KKT conditions 0 ∈ ∂wfi(w) for fi being the objective function for learning on Di, and ∂w
denoting the subdifferential operator. Now for each i ∈ [2]
∂wfi(w) = w − C
n
n∑
j=1
yi,jxi,j 1˜ [1− yi,jwxi,j ] ,
where
1˜[x] =

{0} , if x < 0
[0, 1] , if x = 0
{1} , if x > 0
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0 1M1M 1M-m1M-m
0
CM(n-1)n
C(M(n-2)+m)n
C(m-M)n w
y
0 1M1M 1M-m1M-m
0
C(M-n)n
C(Mn-m)n
w
y
Figure 6.1. For each i ∈ [2], the SVM's primal solution w?i on database Di constructed in
the proof of Lemma 17, corresponds to the crossing point of line y = w with y = w−∂wfi(w).
Database D1 is shown on the left, database D2 is shown on the right.
is the subdifferential of (x)+. Thus for each i ∈ [2], w?i ∈ Cn
∑n
j=1 yi,jxi,j 1˜ [1− yi,jw?i xi,j ] which is equivalent
to
w?1 ∈
CM(n− 1)
n
1˜
[
1
M
− w?1
]
+
C(m−M)
n
1˜
[
w?1 −
1
m−M
]
w?2 ∈
CM(n− 1)
n
1˜
[
1
M
− w?2
]
+
C(M −m)
n
1˜
[
1
M −m − w
?
2
]
.
The RHSs of these conditions correspond to decreasing piecewise-constant functions, and the conditions are
met when the corresponding functions intersect with the diagonal y = x line, as shown in Figure 6. If
C(M(n−2)+m)
n <
1
M then w
?
1 =
C(M(n−2)+m)
n . And if
C(Mn−m)
n <
1
M then w
?
2 =
C(Mn−m)
n . So provided that
1
M >
C(Mn−m)
n = max
{
C(M(n−2)+m)
n ,
C(Mn−m)
n
}
, we have |w?1 − w?2 | = 2Cn |M −m|. So taking M = 2nC
and m = nC , this implies
‖f?1 − f?2 ‖∞ ≥ |f?1 (1)− f?2 (1)|
= |w?1 − w?2 |
= 2 ,
provided  <
√
C
2n . 
Theorem 18 (Lower bound on optimal differential privacy for hinge loss SVM). For any C > 0, n > 1,
δ ∈ (0, 1) and  ∈
(
0,
√
C
2n
)
, the optimal differential privacy for the hinge-loss SVM with linear kernel is
lower-bounded by loge
1−δ
δ . In other words, for any C, β > 0 and n > 1 if a mechanism Mˆ is (, δ)-useful
and β-differentially private then either  ≥
√
C
2n or δ ≥ exp(−β).
Proof. Consider (, δ)-useful mechanism Mˆ with respect to SVM learning mechanism M with parameter
C > 0, hinge loss and linear kernel on n training examples, where δ > 0 and
√
C
2n >  > 0. By Lemma 17
there exists a pair of neighboring databasesD1, D2 on n entries, such that ‖f?1−f?2 ‖∞ > 2 where f?i = fM(Di)
for each i ∈ [2]. Let fˆi = fMˆ(Di) for each i ∈ [2]. Then by the utility of Mˆ ,
Pr
(
fˆ1 ∈ B∞ (f?1 )
)
≥ 1− δ ,(6.1)
Pr
(
fˆ2 ∈ B∞ (f?1 )
)
≤ Pr
(
fˆ2 /∈ B∞ (f?2 )
)
< δ .(6.2)
Let Pˆ1 and Pˆ2 be the distributions of Mˆ(D1) and Mˆ(D2) respectively so that Pˆi(t) = Pr
(
Mˆ(Di) = t
)
.
Then by Inequalities (6.1) and (6.2)
ET∼P1
[
dP2(T )
dP1(T )
∣∣∣∣ T ∈ B∞ (f?1 )] =

B∞ (f?1 )
dP2(t)
dP1(t)dP1(t)
B∞ (f?1 ) dP1(t)
≤ δ
1− δ .
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Thus there exists a t such that log
Pr(Mˆ(D1)=t)
Pr(Mˆ(D2)=t) ≥ log
1−δ
δ . 
The same technique can be extended to prove a stronger lower bound. First we construct a set of N > 1
neighboring databases having SVM images that are a 2-packing. To achieve this for any N we move from
linear to RBF kernel.
Lemma 19. For any C > 0, n > C, 0 <  < C4n , and 0 < σ <
√
1
2 loge 2
there exists a set of N =
⌊
2
σ
√
2
loge 2
⌋
pairwise-neighboring databases {Di}Ni=1 on n examples, such that the functions f?i parametrized by hinge-loss
SVM run on Di with parameter C and RBF kernel with parameter σ, satisfy
∥∥f?i − f?j ∥∥∞ > 2 for each
i 6= j.
Proof. Construct N > 1 pairwise neighboring databases each on n examples in R2 as follows. Each database
i has n − 1 negative examples xi,1 = . . . = xi,n−1 = 0, and database Di has positive example xi,n =
(cos θi, sin θi) where θi = 2piiN . Consider the result of running SVM with hinge loss and RBF kernel on each
Di. For each database k(xi,s,xi,t) = 1 and k(xi,s,xi,n) = exp
(− 12σ2 ) =: γ for all s, t ∈ [n− 1] . Notice that
the range space of γ is (0, 1). Since the inner-products and labels are database-independent, the SVM dual
variables are also database-independent. Each involves solving
max
α∈Rn
α′1− 1
2
α′
(
1 −γ
−γ 1
)
α
s.t. 0 ≤ α ≤ C
n
1
By symmetry α?1 = . . . = α
?
n−1, so we can reduce this to the equivalent program on two variables:
max
α∈R2
α′
(
n− 1
1
)
− 1
2
α′
(
(n− 1)2 −γ(n− 1)
−γ(n− 1) 1
)
α
s.t. 0 ≤ α ≤ C
n
1
Consider first the unconstrained program. In this case the necessary first-order KKT condition is that
0 =
(
n− 1
1
)
−
(
(n− 1)2 −γ(n− 1)
−γ(n− 1) 1
)
α? .
This implies
α? =
(
(n− 1)2 −γ(n− 1)
−γ(n− 1) 1
)−1(
n− 1
1
)
=
1
(n− 1)2(1− γ2)
(
1 γ(n− 1)
γ(n− 1) (n− 1)2
)(
n− 1
1
)
=
1
(n− 1)2(1− γ)(1 + γ)
(
1 γ(n− 1)
γ(n− 1) (n− 1)2
)(
n− 1
1
)
=
1
(n− 1)2(1− γ)(1 + γ)
(
(n− 1)(1 + γ)
(n− 1)2(1 + γ)
)
=
(
1
(n−1)(1−γ)
1
1−γ
)
.
Since this solution is strictly positive, it follows that at most two (upper) constraints can be active. Thus four
cases are possible: the solution lies in the interior of the feasible set, or one or both upper box-constraints
hold with equality. Noting that 1(n−1)(1−γ) ≤ 11−γ it follows that α? is feasible iff 11−γ ≤ Cn . This is equivalent
to C ≥ 11−γn > n, since γ ∈ (0, 1). This corresponds to under-regularization.
If both constraints hold with equality we have α? = Cn 1, which is always feasible.
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In the case where the first constraint holds with equality α?1 =
C
n , the second dual variable is found by
optimizing
α?2 = max
α2∈R
α′
(
n− 1
1
)
− 1
2
α′
(
(n− 1)2 −γ(n− 1)
−γ(n− 1) 1
)
α
= max
α2∈R
C(n− 1)
n
+ α2 − 12
((
C(n− 1)
n
)2
− 2Cγ(n− 1)
n
α2 + α22
)
= max
α2∈R
−1
2
α22 + α2
(
1 +
Cγ(n− 1)
n
)
,
implying α?2 = 1 + Cγ
n−1
n . This solution is feasible provided 1 + Cγ
n−1
n ≤ Cn iff n ≤ C(1+γ)1+Cγ . Again this
corresponds to under-regularization.
Finally in the case where the second constraint holds with equality α?2 =
C
n , the first dual is found by
optimizing
α?2 = max
α1∈R
α′
(
n− 1
1
)
− 1
2
α′
(
(n− 1)2 −γ(n− 1)
−γ(n− 1) 1
)
α
= max
α1∈R
(n− 1)α1 + C
n
− 1
2
(
(n− 1)2α21 − 2Cγ
n− 1
n
α1 +
C2
n2
)
= max
α2∈R
−1
2
(n− 1)2α21 + α1
(
1 +
Cγ
n
)
,
implying α?1 =
1+Cγn
(n−1)2 . This is feasible provided
1+Cγn
(n−1)2 ≤ Cn . Passing back to the program on n variables,
by the invariance of the duals to the database, for any pair Di, Dj
|fi (xi,n)− fj (xi,n)| = α?n (1− k (xi,n,xj,n))
≥ α?n
(
1−max
q 6=i
k (xi,n,xq,n)
)
.
Now a simple argument shows that this maximum is equal to γ4 exp
(
sin2 piN
)
for all i. The maximum objective
is optimized when |q− i| = 1. In this case |θi − θq| = 2piN . The norm ‖xi,n − xq,n‖ = 2 sin |θi−θq|2 = 2 sin piN by
basic geometry. Thus k (xi,n,xq,n) = exp
(
−‖xi,n−xq,n‖22σ2
)
= exp
(− 2σ2 sin2 piN ) = γ4 exp (sin2 piN ) as claimed.
Notice that N ≥ 2 so the second term is in (1, e], while the first term is in (0, 1). In summary we have shown
that for any i 6= j
|fi (xi,n)− fj (xi,n)| ≥
(
1− exp
(
− 2
σ2
sin2
pi
N
))
α?n .
Assume γ < 12 . If n > C then n >
C
2 > (1 − γ)C in which implies case 1 is infeasible. Similarly since
Cγ n−1n > 0, n > C implies 1 +Cγ
n−1
n > 1 >
C
n which implies case 3 is infeasible. Thus provided that γ <
1
2
and n > C we have that either case 2 or case 4 must hold. In both cases α?n =
C
n giving
|fi (xi,n)− fj (xi,n)| ≥
(
1− exp
(
− 2
σ2
sin2
pi
N
))
C
n
.
Provided that σ ≤
√
2
log 2 sin
pi
N we have
(
1− exp (− 2σ2 sin2 piN )) Cn ≥ (1− 12) Cn = C2n . Now for small x we
can take the linear approximation sinx ≥ xpi/2 for x ∈ [0, pi/2]. If N ≥ 2 then sin piN ≥ 2N . Thus in this case
we can take σ ≤
√
2
log 2
2
N to imply |fi (xi,n)− fj (xi,n)| ≥ C2n . This bound on σ in turn implies the following
bound on γ: γ = exp
(− 12σ2 ) ≤ exp(−N2 loge 224 ). Thus taking N > 4, in conjunction with σ ≤ √ 2log 2 2N
implies γ ≤ 12 . Rather than selecting N which bounds σ, we can choose N in terms of σ. σ ≤
√
2
log 2
2
N is
implied by N = 2σ
√
2
loge 2
. So for small σ we can construct more databases leading to the desired separation.
Finally, N > 4 implies that we must constrain σ <
√
1
2 loge 2
.
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In summary, if n > C and σ <
√
1
2 loge 2
then |fi (xi,n)− fj (xi,n)| ≥ C2n for each i 6= j ∈ [N ] where
N =
⌊
2
σ
√
2
loge 2
⌋
. Moreover if  ≤ C4n then for any i 6= j this implies ‖fi − fj‖∞ ≥ 2 as claimed. 
Theorem 20 (Strong lower bound on optimal differential privacy for hinge loss). For C > 0, n > C,
δ ∈ (0, 1),  ∈ (0, n4C ), and σ < √ 12 loge 2 the optimal differential privacy for the hinge SVM with RBF
kernel having parameter σ is lower-bounded by loge
(1−δ)(N−1)
δ , where N =
⌊
2
σ
√
2
loge 2
⌋
. That is, under these
conditions, all mechanisms that are (, δ)-useful wrt hinge SVM with RBF kernel for any σ do not achieve
differential privacy at any level.
Proof. Consider (, δ)-useful mechanism Mˆ with respect to hinge SVM learning mechanism M with param-
eter C > 0 and RBF kernel with parameter 0 < σ <
√
1
2 loge 2
on n training examples, where δ > 0 and
n
4C >  > 0. Let N =
⌊
2
σ
√
2
loge 2
⌋
> 4. By Lemma 19 there exist pairwise neighboring databases D1, . . . , DN
of n entries, such that {f?i }Ni=1 is an -packing wrt the L∞-norm, where f?i = fM(Di). So by the utility of
Mˆ , for each i ∈ [N ]
Pr
(
fˆi ∈ B∞ (f?i )
)
≥ 1− δ ,(6.3) ∑
j 6=1
Pr
(
fˆ1 ∈ B∞
(
f?j
)) ≤ Pr(fˆ1 /∈ B∞ (f?1 )) < δ ,
⇒ ∃j 6= 1, Pr
(
fˆ1 ∈ B∞
(
f?j
))
<
δ
N − 1 .(6.4)
Let Pˆ1 and Pˆj be the distributions of Mˆ(D1) and Mˆ(Dj) respectively so that for each, Pˆi(t) = Pr
(
Mˆ(Di) = t
)
.
Then by Inequalities (6.3) and (6.4)
ET∼Pj
[
dP1(T )
dPj(T )
∣∣∣∣ T ∈ B∞ (f?j )] =

B∞ (f?j )
dP1(t)
dPj(t)dPj(t)
B∞ (f?j ) dPj(t)
≤ δ
(1− δ)(N − 1) .
Thus there exists a t such that log
Pr(Mˆ(Dj)=t)
Pr(Mˆ(D1)=t) ≥ log
(1−δ)(N−1)
δ . 
Note that n > C is a weak condition, since C should grow like
√
n for universal consistency. Also note
that this negative result is consistent with our upper bound on optimal differential privacy: σ affects σp,
increasing the upper bounds as σ ↓ 0.
7. Conclusion & Open Problems
We have presented a pair of new mechanisms for private SVM learning. In each case we have established
differential privacy via the algorithmic stability of regularized empirical risk minimization. To achieve utility
under infinite-dimensional feature mappings, we perform regularized ERM in a random Reproducing Kernel
Hilbert Space whose kernel approximates the target RKHS kernel. This trick, borrowed from large-scale
learning, permits the mechanism to privately respond with a finite representation of a maximum-margin
hyperplane classifier. We then established the high-probability, pointwise similarity between the resulting
function and the SVM classifier through a new smoothness result of regularized ERM with respect to per-
turbations of the RKHS. The bounds on differential privacy and utility combine to upper bound the optimal
differential privacy of SVM learning for hinge-loss. This quantity is the optimal level of privacy among all
mechanisms that are (, δ)-useful with respect to the hinge-loss SVM. Finally, we derived a lower bound on
this quantity which established that any mechanism that is too accurate with respect to the hinge SVM
with RBF kernel, with any non-trivial probability, cannot be β-differentially private for small β. The lower
bounds explicitly depend on the variance of the RBF kernel.
An interesting open problem is to derive lower bounds holding for moderate to large . Another direction
for future research is to extend our mechanisms to other kernel methods. Finally, a general connection
between algorithmic stability and global sensitivity would immediately suggest a number of practical privacy-
preserving learning mechanisms.
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Appendix A. Proofs for Subdifferentiable Loss Functions
The main results were stated in terms of non-differentiable convex loss functions so that they would hold
for the hinge loss, however the proofs in the main text applied to differentiable loss functions only. For
completeness we now re-prove the appropriate lemma's for subdifferentiable loss functions of which general
convex loss functions are a special case.
In each case the proofs for subdifferentiable loss are essentially identical to the differentiable loss proofs:
we discuss only the arguments that change when generalizing to non-differentiable loss functions. Previously
∂w referred to the gradient operator, now it refers to the subdifferential operator. The subscript reminds
us that we are viewing the operand as a function of w only. Similarly other subscripts extend the notion
of other partial derivatives. Previously there was a unique gradient at each point, now there may be many
subgradients, making up the subdifferential set at a point. As we are dealing with sets of subgradients,
we use the shorthand that for sets S, T , vector v and scalar a that: S + T = {g + h | g ∈ S, h ∈ T}, aS =
{ag | g ∈ S}, S+v = {g + v | g ∈ S}, 〈S,v〉 = {〈g,v〉 | g ∈ S} and S ≥ T means g ≥ h for all (g, h) ∈ S×T .
Lemma 21 generalizes Lemma 6 on the sensitivity of the SVM primal weight vector, to general (i.e.,
subdifferentiable) convex loss functions.
Lemma 21. Consider loss function `(y, yˆ) that is convex and L-Lipschitz in yˆ, and RKHS H induced by
finite F -dimensional feature mapping φ with bounded kernel k(x,x) ≤ κ2 for all x ∈ Rd. Let wS ∈ RF be
the minimizer of the following regularized empirical risk function for each database S = {(xi, yi)}ni=1
Rreg(w, S) =
C
n
n∑
i=1
` (yi, fw(xi)) +
1
2
‖w‖22 .
Then for every pair of neighboring databases D,D′ of n entries, ‖wD −wD′‖1 ≤ 4LCκ
√
F/n.
Proof. For convenience we define Remp(w, S) = n−1
∑n
i=1 `(yi, fw(xi) for any training set S, then the first-
order necessary KKT conditions imply
0 ∈ ∂wRreg(wD, D) = C∂wRemp(wD, D) +wD ,(A.1)
0 ∈ ∂wRreg(wD′ , D′) = C∂wRemp(wD′ , D′) +wD′ .(A.2)
Define the auxiliary risk function
R˜(w) = C〈∂wRemp(wD, D)− ∂wRemp(wD′ , D′), w −wD′〉+ 12‖w −wD′‖
2
2 .
It is easy to see that R˜(w) is strictly convex in w and that R˜(wD′) = {0}. And by Equation (A.2)
C∂wRemp(wD, D) +w ∈ C∂wRemp(wD, D)− C∂wRemp(wD′ , D′) +w −wD′
= ∂wR˜(w) ,
which combined with Equation (A.1) implies 0 ∈ ∂wR˜(wD), so that R˜(w) is minimized at wD. Thus there
exists some non-positive r ∈ R˜(wD). Next simplify the first term of R˜(wD), scaled by n/C for notational
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convenience:
n〈∂wRemp(wD, D)− ∂wRemp(wD′ , D′), w −wD′〉
=
n∑
i=1
〈∂w` (yi, fwD (xi))− ∂w`
(
y′i, fwD′ (x
′
i)
)
, w −wD′〉
=
n−1∑
i=1
(
`′ (yi, fwD (xi))− `′
(
yi, fwD′ (xi)
)) (
fwD (xi)− fwD′ (xi)
)
+`′ (yn, fwD (xn))
(
fwD (xn)− fwD′ (xn)
)− `′ (y′n, fwD′ (x′n)) (fwD (x′n)− fwD′ (x′n))
≥ `′ (yn, fwD (xn))
(
fwD (xn)− fwD′ (xn)
)− `′ (y′n, fwD′ (x′n)) (fwD (x′n)− fwD′ (x′n)) ,
where the second equality follows from ∂w` (y, fw(x)) = `′ (y, fw(x)) φ(x), where `′(y, yˆ) = ∂yˆ`(y, yˆ), and
x′i = xi and y
′
i = yi for each i ∈ [n − 1]. The inequality follows from the convexity of ` in its second
argument.6 Combined with the existence of non-positive r ∈ R˜(wD) this yields that there exists g ∈
`′
(
y′n, fwD′ (x
′
n)
) (
fwD (x
′
n)− fwD′ (x′n)
)− `′ (yn, fwD (xn)) (fwD (xn)− fwD′ (xn)) such that
0 ≥ n
C
r
≥ g + n
2C
‖wD −wD′‖22
And since |g| ≤ 2L∥∥fwD − fwD′∥∥∞ by the Lipschitz continuity of `, this in turn implies
n
2C
‖wD −wD′‖22 ≤ 2L
∥∥fwD − fwD′∥∥∞ .(A.3)
Now by the reproducing property and Cauchy-Schwartz inequality we can upper bound the classifier differ-
ence's infinity norm by the Euclidean norm on the weight vectors: for each x∣∣fwD (x)− fwD′ (x)∣∣ = |〈φ(x),wD −wD′〉|
≤ ‖φ(x)‖2 ‖wD −wD′‖2
=
√
k(x,x) ‖wD −wD′‖2
≤ κ ‖wD −wD′‖2 .
Combining this with Inequality (A.3) yields ‖wD −wD′‖2 ≤ 4LCκ/n as claimed. The L1-based sensitivity
then follows from ‖w‖1 ≤
√
F‖w‖2 for all w ∈ RF . 
Next we move to proofs of utility. Lemma 22 mirrors Lemma 12, generalizing the result to non-
differentiable convex loss functions.
Lemma 22. Let H be an RKHS with translation-invariant kernel k, and let Hˆ be the random RKHS
corresponding to feature map (4.1) induced by k. Let C be a positive scalar and loss `(y, yˆ) be convex and
L-Lipschitz continuous in yˆ. Consider the regularized empirical risk minimizers in each RKHS
f? ∈ arg min
f∈H
C
n
n∑
i=1
`(yi, f(xi)) +
1
2
‖f‖2H ,
g? ∈ arg min
g∈Hˆ
C
n
n∑
i=1
`(yi, g(xi)) +
1
2
‖g‖2Hˆ .
Let M ⊆ Rd be any set containing x1, . . . ,xn. For any  > 0, if the dual variables from both optimiza-
tions have L1-norms bounded by some Λ > 0 and
∥∥∥k − kˆ∥∥∥
∞;M
≤ min
{
1, 
2
22
“
Λ+2
√
(CL+Λ/2)Λ
”2
}
then
‖f? − g?‖∞;M ≤ /2.
6Namely for convex f and any a, b ∈ R, (ga − gb) (a− b) ≥ 0 for all ga ∈ ∂f(a) and all gb ∈ ∂f(b).
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Proof. Denote the empirical risk functional Remp[f ] = n−1
∑n
i=1 ` (yi, f(xi)) and the regularized empirical
risk functional Rreg[f ] = C Remp[f ] + ‖f‖2/2, for the appropriate RKHS norm (either H or Hˆ). Let f?
denote the regularized empirical risk minimizer in H, given by parameter vector α?, and let g? denote the
regularized empirical risk minimizer in Hˆ given by parameter vector β?. Let gα? =
∑n
i=1 α
?
i yiφˆ(xi) and
fβ? =
∑n
i=1 β
?
i yiφ(xi) denote the images of f
? and g? under the natural mapping between the spans of the
data in RKHS's Hˆ and H respectively. We will first show that these four functions have arbitrarily close
regularized empirical risk in their respective RKHS, and then that this implies uniform proximity of the
functions themselves. First observe that for any g ∈ Hˆ
RHˆreg[g] = C Remp[g] +
1
2
‖g‖2Hˆ
≥ C〈∂gRemp[g?], g − g?〉Hˆ + C Remp[g?] +
1
2
‖g‖2Hˆ
= 〈∂gRHˆreg[g?], g − g?〉Hˆ − 〈g?, g − g?〉Hˆ + C Remp[g?] +
1
2
‖g‖2Hˆ .
The inequality follows from the convexity ofRemp[·] and holds for all elements of the subdifferential ∂gRemp[g?].
The subsequent equality holds by ∂gR
Hˆ
reg[g] = C ∂gRemp[g] + g. Now since 0 ∈ ∂gRHˆreg[g?], it follows that
RHˆreg[g] ≥ C Remp[g?] +
1
2
‖g‖2Hˆ − 〈g?, g − g?〉Hˆ
= C Remp[g?] +
1
2
‖g?‖2Hˆ +
1
2
‖g‖2Hˆ −
1
2
‖g?‖2Hˆ − 〈g?, g − g?〉Hˆ
= RHˆreg[g
?] +
1
2
‖g‖2Hˆ − 〈g?, g〉Hˆ +
1
2
‖g?‖2Hˆ
= RHˆreg[g
?] +
1
2
‖g − g?‖2Hˆ .
The remainder of Lemma 12's proof remains the same, as it does not depend on the loss's differentiability. 
